On the Spread of Deviant Religious Rulings
By: Dr. Hamdallah Hafez al-Safty
During the time of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), people used to ask him for rulings on matters of their religion. He would give them rulings based on what Allah Almighty revealed to him from the revelation, or he would establish a Sunnah for them regarding matters not explicitly mentioned in the Holy Quran. They were obligated to follow it according to the text of the Holy Quran: « And whatever the Messenger gives you, take it; and whatever he forbids you, abstain [from it] » [Q. 59:7]
A number of the Prophet’s distinguished companions (may Allah be pleased with them) memorized his rulings and deepened their jurisprudential understanding through them, for they possessed the innate understanding of Islamic law (Shariah), thanks to their sound minds, their presence at the revelation, and their grasp of its objectives. After the Prophet’s passing, they found themselves facing many issues for which there was no explicit text in the Quran or Sunnah. They resorted to independent reasoning (Ijtihad) to determine the legal rulings for the newly arising matters, relying on a sound methodology and precise principles that guided their derivation of rulings from the texts of Islamic law (Shariah). They did not act haphazardly without a legal framework to protect them or a guiding principle to lead them.
After the Companions came the generation of the Followers, who are considered the link between the Companions and the generation of the Imams, the founders of the schools of jurisprudence, and they narrated the Prophetic Hadiths and the traditions of his Companions; they strove to pursue what was not explicitly addressed in the Quran, Hadith, and Tradition. In this effort, they were guided by the example of the Companions, following their footsteps in their practice of independent reasoning (Ijtihad).
Then came their students, whose history is linked to the formation of the famous schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali). They inherited from their predecessors their methodology in jurisprudential research, as the methodology followed by the Mujtahids from among the Companions and Followers was not an intellectual invention created by the mind out of nothing, but rather a set of innate laws that govern the course of the human mind, and to which the mind naturally submits due to their self-evidence. This is because they are among the established truths to which minds submit, and to which sound nature submits, free from the impurities of whims, without toil or effort.
The position of the human intellect regarding the jurisprudential methodology followed by the Mujtahids is observation, then discovery, then establishing and formulating rules, not inventing or creating the methodology. If the mind could invent a scientific methodology, the invention process itself would need a methodology to control it and protect its steps from error and delusion, and this methodology in turn would need another methodology, leading, infinitely, to a regress of non-essential causes, which is impossible according to the intuition of minds.
Thus, these schools of jurisprudence became the lenses through which Ummah perceived the rulings of the noble Shariah, and through which it issued judgments on what was accepted or rejected. Their jurists and scholars (Mujtahids) dealt with the emerging jurisprudential issues according to the research methodologies developed to reach sound rulings consistent with the objectives of the noble Shariah in human life, and according to the requirements of their times. Hence, Shariah proved itself valid and beneficial for all times and places.
With the rise of whims and the fragmentation of the Ummah into sects and factions—each rejoicing in what they have—every group adopted its own reference. Their goal became justification rather than refinement, and seeking a pretext rather than true reliance. Consequently, jurisprudential anomalies began to surface, and the pseudo-jurists of our era developed a strange obsession with reviving obsolete opinions under the guise of ‘ease’ and the pursuit of ‘public interest’ or ‘Maqasid’ (higher objectives). In doing so, they ignore that Shariah is not only objectives and generalities but also settled and refined rulings that have been practiced by the Ummah across the East and the West.
Perhaps the reason for this strange understanding is the lack of adherence to the methodologies of understanding, rules of inference, and ways of engaging with the rulings of the sublime Shariah principles established by the early Imams, which has crept into the scholarly environment where these pseudo-scholars were raised.
Such individuals and others like them are free to hold and express whatever views they wish, bearing full moral responsibility for them. The public, in turn, is equally free to debate those views or merely record them under the names of their proponents, so that they may stand as a clear example for future generations of the extent of the jurisprudential deviation to which these individuals have gone.
Modern means of communication have contributed to the spread of these jurisprudential deviations, given their remarkable ability to reach vast global audiences in a short time and with minimal effort.
Those with an interest in Islamic jurisprudence may well recall the fatwa on breastfeeding an adult, whose viewership on YouTube ranged from as few as 138 views to as many as one million. A similar case is the fatwa denying the obligatory nature of the hijab, one related YouTube video of which received 44,496 views.
Other examples include the fatwa permitting the consumption of wine made from sources other than grapes unconditionally; the fatwa asserting that fasting during Ramadan is optional rather than obligatory; and the fatwa denying the validity of verbal divorce, among many others well known to those concerned with Islamic jurisprudence and legal opinions.
No one can deny the harmful impact of such deviant fatwas on society. They distort the image of religion and its rulings, render it a subject of ridicule and derision, undermine trust in scholars and institutions of religious scholarship, and sow confusion among the general public. Modern means of communication further facilitate the spread of these fatwas and foster an atmosphere of intellectual conflict between scholars and thinkers over contested ideas.
In my view, those responsible for the field of jurisprudence and fatwa should take several essential steps. These include establishing clear guidelines for issuing fatwas through social media and ensuring the careful selection of individuals who meet the recognized qualifications and conditions of iftāʾ before allowing them to issue fatwas in the digital sphere. Scholars and muftis across the Islamic world should also be encouraged to coordinate their efforts in order to deliberate on emerging issues and unprecedented cases, and to issue collective fatwas through modern communication platforms rather than relying on individual rulings, which are more prone to error and often involve the unwarranted generalization of exceptional cases.
In addition, legal mechanisms should be employed to restrict the dissemination of deviant fatwas that harm the image of religion and its rulings on these platforms, instead of amplifying their impact by responding to them and drawing further public attention. Equally important is the coordination between fatwa institutions and bodies of Islamic scholarship on the one hand, and faculties of media and communication on the other, with a view to developing appropriate training programs for media professionals who wish to work as presenters or producers of religious programs in general, and fatwa-related programs in particular.
